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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE INDIGENT ACCUSED IN
COURTS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN
NEW YORK STATEf
PAUL IvAN BiRzoN,* ROBERT KASANOF** AND JOSEPH FORMA*'**
"The law in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."
ANATOLE FRANcE, Le Lys Rouge
HISToRIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A N accused's right to the assistance of counsel in the preparation and de-
fense of criminal prosecutions is often regarded as one of ancient common
law derivation.' In fact, this important privilege is of rather recent origin in
common law systems and actually became a part of the legal processes of the
American colonies long before its full acceptance in England.
2
Prior to the late seventeenth century, the English courts allowed defendants
in civil actions and misdemeanor trials full assistance of counsel, while those
accused of treason or felonies were denied such aid except as to questions of
law.3 This practice in effect, deprived one of the assistance of counsel in those
cases where it was most needed, and the voices of England's greatest lawyers and
scholars were raised in protest and demand for change.
4
Shortly after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the harshness of the rule
was somewhat alleviated by legislation which allowed the use of counsel in trials
for treason and which even provided that the courts must assign counsel to those
f The survey of systems for providing counsel for indigent persons accused of crime in
New York State was conducted as an integral part of a nationwide audit in the state courts
conducted by the American Bar Foundation in cooperation with a special committee of the
American Bar Association and associate committees in the states. The survey was performed
under the supervision of the Bar Foundation to whom we gratefully acknowledge permission
to publish this article. The national report which is tentatively titled "Defense of the Poor
in Criminal Cases in American State Courts-A Field Study and Report" is scheduled for
publication in 1965.
The authors further acknowledge the valuable counsel furnished by the members of the
A.B.A. Associate State Committee whose members are the following: Chairman, Vilas M.
Swan, Rochester; Samuel N. Barish, White Plains; Edward Q. Carr, New York; Charles B.
Close, Syracuse; Martin F. Holleran, Binghamton; J. Clement Johnson, Buffalo; Hugh M.
Jones, Jr., Canandaigua; Peter H. Kaminer, New York; Rose Baum Kraut, Poughkeepsie;
John B. Poersch, Schenectady,
The conclusions and recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the American Bar Association, American Bar Foundation, or the
Associate State Committee.
* Member of the Bar-State of New York; Lecturer, School of Law, State University
of New York at Buffalo.
** Member of the Bar-State of New York.
*** Senior, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 246 Pa. 529, 530, 92 Aft. 705, 706 (1914).
2. Special Committee of the Association of the City of New York and the National
Legal Aid Association, Equal Justice for the Accused, 40 (1959) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C.
Special Committee].
3. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 475 (7th ed. 1903).
4. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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defendants who so requested in such trials.5 Although the courts further les-
sened the severity of the English practice in a series of cases in the eighteenth
century,6 it was not until 1836, by statute,7 that all persons accused of any
felony were given the right to full assistance of counsel.8
Long before the English courts and Parliament remedied the gross injus-
tices prevalent, and prior to the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights,
individual American colonies had rejected the English rule which at that time
still denied counsel in felony trials. By constitution or statute, twelve of the
thirteen original colonies had acted to establish and guarantee the right to coun-
sel in criminal prosecutions, albeit in some of the colonies the right was limited
to the more serious crimes.9
With the passage by Congress of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and with the
ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the right of accused persons to the
assistance of counsel in all stages of every criminal trial in the Federal Courts
was established.' 0 The Supreme Court has declared that a federal court lacks
the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty if this
constitutional protection is denied." A defendant in a federal court is, further-
more, entitled to be represented by counsel retained by him in preliminary
proceedings before a commissioner. 12
While there is some mention found of the possibility of a person having
another plead for him in a legal proceeding in the early laws of the Colony of
New York,' 3 the first clear statement of an accused's absolute right to counsel
in any criminal trial is found in the constitution of the State of New York of
1777, and this guarantee, construed to mean at least, that a defendant is
never to be denied the privilege of retaining counsel of his own choosing
to aid him in a criminal proceeding, is embodied in the present New York
constitution. 14 The New York courts have declared that the right to counsel
attaches to every person accused of crime,15 and they have defined the right to
encompass the privilege of allowing the defendant to retain counsel of his
choice' at everr stage of a criminal trial, whether felony or misdemeanor, held
5. 7&8Will. 3, c. 3§1 (1695).
6. N.Y.C. Special Committee 41.
7. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114 § 1 (1836).
8. Cooley, supra note 3, at 477.
9. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64 (1932).
10. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir.
1950).
11. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
12. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5b.
13. Duke of York's Laws (1665-75) reprinted in XXIII N.Y. Assembly Doc. No. 107,
Pt. 1 (1895).
14. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6; People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 412, 187 N.E. 298, 300
(1933); see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 468 n.22 (1941).
15. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
16. See People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 412, 187 N.E. 298, 300 (1933), where the Court
stated that once a defendant appears with his own counsel the court loses the power to assign
counsel to that defendant.
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in any court.17 The courts have further construed the right of retention of coun-
sel as entitling the accused to effective representation, which in turn has been
held to include counsel free from any interest conflicting with the defendant's,' 8
providing the accused with reasonable adjournments to enable him to employ
counsel, 19 providing the accused with the opportunity of private consultation
and interviews with counsel sufficiently prior to the trial to insure effective prep-
aration of the case,20 and lastly, to include allowing defendant's counsel reason-
able continuances to facilitate preparation of his case.2 '
While the right to counsel, constitutionally guaranteed in this jurisdiction,
clearly means that a person cannot be prevented from hiring legal assistance if he
wishes and while this privilege does include the fundamental safeguards just
mentioned, there are other, equally essential elements inherent in the principle
of right to counsel: the right to be informed of one's right to counsel and the
right in certain circumstances to have counsel appointed by the court.
In both the Federal and New York courts, a person accused of crime has
a clear right by statutory mandate,2 2 to be informed of his right to counsel in
unequivocal and unambiguous terms. 23 Observance of this statutory mandate is a
basic jurisdictional requirement and goes to the very essence of according due
process.2 4 Under the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, the duty to inform
an accused of his right to counsel arises when he is brought before a magistrate
upon an arrest either with or without a warrant on a charge of having commit-
ted a crime,2 5 or upon arraignment on an indictment,2 6 or upon being brought
before a magistrate in a police court or a court of special sessions. 27
At the point in time at which a defendant is informed of his right to coun-
sel he is also entitled to reasonable time to employ counsel and an adjournment
for that purpose if necessary.
28
Therefore it is certain that upon arraignment or preliminary hearing a de-
fendant is entitled to be informed of his right to counsel. However, a grave ques-
tion arises as to whether a person is to be so informed during the interim between
17. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. §§ 8, 188; People ex rel. Steinhardt v. Fuller, 15 N.Y. Cr.
344, 68 N.Y. Supp. 742 (Sup. Ct. 1901); N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6; People v. Abatti, 31 N.Y.
Cr. 168, 15 N.Y. Supp. 890 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1914); Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1157
(1926).
18. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
19. People v. Hull, 251 App. Div. 40, 296 N.Y. Supp. 216 (2d Dep't 1937); People v.
Kerber, 172 App. Div. 755, 159 N.Y. Supp. 215 (1st Dep't 1916).
20. People v. Cooper, 307 N.Y. 253, 259, 120 N.E.2d 813, 816 (1954); People v.
McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 483, 53 N.E.2d 356, 357 (1944); see also People v. Snyder 297
N.Y. 81, 90, 74 N.E.2d 657, 666 (1947).
21. Walleck v. Hudspeth, 128 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1942).
22. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 188, 308, 699.
23. People v. Marra, 1 A.D.2d 545, 152 N.Y.S.2d 69 (3d Dep't 1956).
24. See, e.g., People v. Koch, 299 N.Y. 378, 87 N.E.2d 417 (1949).
25. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 188.
26. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308; People ex rel. Moore v. Hunt, 258 App, Div. 24, 16
N.Y.S.2d 25 (4th Dep't 1939).
27. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 699.
28. People v. Marincic, 2 N.Y.2d 181, 139 N.E.2d 529, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1957); People
v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
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his arrest and his arraignment or preliminary hearing. Although several recent
cases in New York have held post-arrest, pre-arraingment confessions inadmis-
sible in evidence where counsel was denied access to the accused, or where coun-
sel was requested by the accused and the request denied,2 9 and while it would
seem that there is a movement toward acceptance of the English practice that
arresting officers inform the person arrested of his right to counsel at the time
of arrest"0 the New York Court of Appeals in a very recent case3 ' has clearly
stated that the arresting officers do not have a duty to inform a defendant of his
right to counsel or his right to remain silent. Final pronouncement of the law in
this area may well be forthcoming in the near future if the Supreme Court de-
cides Durado v. California82 which deals with this problem.
In view of the fact that it has been estimated that more than fifty per
cent of those accused of crime in state and federal courts are financially unable
to obtain counsel, 33 the right of an accused to have counsel assigned him by
the courts is an important element of the right to counsel.
The earliest mandate for the assignment of counsel in the federal courts
was enunciated by Congress in 1790. The privilege was extended however, only
to defendants in capital cases.34 Nearly a century and a half would pass before
the Supreme Court recognized the "obvious truth" and construed the sixth
amendment to require that in federal courts counsel must be provided for all
defendants in all criminal proceedings who are unable to employ counsel, unless
the right is competently and intelligently waived.35 The constitutional right to
have counsel appointed is recognized by Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure but interpretation of the rule indicates that the right relates only
to proceedings in court and does not include preliminary proceedings before a
committing magistrate.30
The history of the right to assigned counsel in the courts of the several
states reveals that while some provided counsel for all indigent indicted persons
quite early,37 most, as recently as twenty-five years ago, only provided for ap-
pointment of counsel to indigents in trials of capital cases or other grave crimes. 38
Less than two decades ago, in the Betts case, the Supreme Court examined the
statutory and constitutional provision for the assignment of counsel in state
criminal cases and declared: "That in the considered judgment of a great ma-
29. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963);
People v. Agar, 44 Misc. 2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
30. See Home Office Circular No. 3/1964 entitled Judge's Rules and Administrative
Directions to the Police, Rules II and III a.
31. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226 (1965).
32. People v. Dorado, 33 U.S. Law Week 2415 (Calif. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1965).
33. N.Y.C. Special Committee 38; see also Pollack, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 737, 738 (1961).
34. 1 Stat. § 29, 118 (1790).
35. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
36. United States ex rel. Rogers v. Cummings, 154 F. Supp. 663 (D.C. Conn. 1956).
37. See, e.g., Act Regulating Proceedings and Trials in Criminal Cases, § 2 (N.J. Mar. 6,
1795).
38. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1941).
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jority of the States, appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential
to a fair trial. '39 The court concluded that the concept of due process incor-
porated in the fourteenth amendment did not require the states to -furnish coun-
sel in every case but only in those cases in which a denial of counsel would be
offensive to common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right.40
The rule laid down in Betts and the problem of a defendant's constitutional
right to counsel in a state court was a continuing source of controversy and
litigation in both state and federal courts. 41
Since that decision, the Supreme Court has steadily expanded and extended
the right of an accused in a state criminal proceeding to be supplied with Court
appointed counsel. 42 The Supreme Court's drive to have the sixth amendment
guarantee of counsel for all indigents incorporated within the fourteenth amend-
ment and thereby to constitute a requisite in state court proceedings was cul-
minated in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainright.43 In that case, the court overruled
Betts v. Brady44 and held that the right of an indigent felony defendant in a
state criminal trial to have counsel, and to have counsel appointed if the need
arises is a -fundamental right essential to a fair trial.46
The State of New York has always evinced a high degree of sensitivity
toward the safeguards inherent in the rights of an accused to have counsel, and
the courts have long recognized their inherent powers to appoint counsel to de-
fend those unable to employ legal assistance. 46 In 1881, legislation was enacted
providing that the courts shall assign counsel to an accused upon his arraign-
ment, but even the present day rules of criminal procedure in the state have
made no provision for assignment earlier than upon arraignment of an indict-
ment.47 It therefore appears that under present New York law assignment of
counsel is possible only in prosecution of indictible crimes and a question of the
constitutionality of this provision under the Gideon formula would seem certain
to arise.
Systems of Providing Counsel to the Indigent Accused
An onerous concomittant of the ever expanding population, urbanization
and industrialization of the United States has been a steady and proportionate
increase in the incidence of crime. The obvious result has been a tremendous
increase in the number of persons charged with commission of crime and a con-
sequently enlarged demand for the aid and assistance of legal counsel. Of even
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 473.
41. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506 (1962); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Shaffer v. Warden, 211
Md. 635, 126 A.2d 573 (1956).
42. Pollack, Equal Jutstice in Practice, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 737, 740, n.11 (1961).
43. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44. 316 U.S. 455 (1940).
45. 373 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
46. People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 412, 187 N.E. 298, 299 (1933).
47. Cf. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
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greater concern is the growing proportion of those charged with crime who will
require free legal representation as indigents.
As early as 1961, it had been estimated that of the 2,000,000 people charged
with major offenses in the United States, in that year, over 1,000,000 would
require court assigned counsel.48 In the State of New York, estimates of the
rate of indigency among persons accused of crime range as high as between 65
and 90 per cent of the total number of felony defendants brought before the-
courts.49 The need for an effective system of free legal representation is acute
and apparent.
Through the years several systems designed to provide -free legal assistance
for the indigent accused have evolved, and these may generally be categorized
within four principal types: the assigned counsel system, the voluntary de-
fender system, the public defender system, and the mixed private (voluntary)
public system.50
The oldest system utilized to provide free legal assistance to the indigent
accused is the assigned counsel system, and it is at present the most widely used
of all the various types.5 '- In fact, this is the system for providing counsel gener-
ally used in the federal courts.52 The organization and operation of the assigned
counsel system is in most instances haphazard. Selection of counsel is made on an
ad hoc, case by case basis by the presiding judge for whatever reasons he deems
appropriate. 53 Often counsel is chosen merely because he happened to be present
in the courtroom at the time of appointment.5 4 Generally there is no systematic
rotation of assignments among the various attorneys qualified to practice before
a court,55 and the burden of repeated uncompensated service falls on a small
segment of the bar.
There is wide agreement at present that the assigned counsel system is in-
adequate and unable to cope with the need for counsel which has been genera-
ted by urbanization and the increasing crime rate.56 The chief criticisms levied
against this system have been the lack of compensation for attorneys providing
services 5 7 the inequitable distribution of the burdens of representation among
a minority of the bar, the lack of a system of reimbursement for expenses in-
48. Pollack, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 737, 738 (1961).
49. Kasanof & Birzon, Draft Report for New York Indigent Accused Persons Study,
Table II, p. 6 (American Bar Foundation, 1964).
50. N.Y.C. Special Committee 47-48.
51. Cf. N.Y.C. Special Committee Appendix I.
52. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44; Cellar, Federal Legislative Proposals to Supply Paid Counsel
to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 697, 698 (1961).
53. People v. Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 173, 178, 173 N.E.2d 227, 231, 212 N.Y.S.2d 401,
405 (1961); People v. Battice, 6 A.D.2d 773, 174 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd, 5
N.Y.2d 946, 183 N.Y.S.2d 564, 156 N.E.2d 920 (1959).
54. Felman, The Defendant's Rights 125 (1958).
55. Contra, R. 12-9 a & d of Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.
56. N.Y.C. Special Committee 45-46; see also Brownell, Legal Aid in the United
States 250 (1951).
57. While New York provides for compensation to assigned counsel in capital cases
by N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308, fifteen states have no mandatory provision for payment
of assigned counsel.
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curred in preparing a defense, and the lack of criminal law trial experience on
the part of many of the attorneys assigned.5
8
The inadequacies inherent in the assigned counsel system led eventually
to a demand and desire for an established permanent body with knowledge of
the law and the ability and initiative to act on behalf of indigents accused of
crime. 59 The need for organized facilities in this area has been met by the de-
velopment of Legal Aid facilities of two kinds: public defenders and voluntary
defenders. The essential difference between these two types being that the for-
mer is exclusively tax supported, while the latter obtains the largest proportion of
its finances from private contributions, philanthropic sources and community
charities.0 ° Although other differences exist in the manner of selection of per-
sonnel and in the type of administrative or governing body or individual in
charge of each, the basic mode of operation is similar.
Where the assigned counsel system operates on a case by case basis with
different counsel being appointed at random, the defender systems feature a con-
tinuing professional defense unit or "law office" approach to the problem of aid
to the indigent. These defender systems provide a constantly available staff of
experienced attorneys and trained investigators upon which the court may call
to secure aid for the indigent. Often voluntary defender units are aided in this
endeavor by non-staff attorneys, and students from area law schools who volun-
teer their services.
The public defenders and their staffs are in actuality, public officials just
as prosecutors or district attorneys, and may be selected for office by appro-
priate officials or the judiciary, or chosen by the people in general elections. It
is this dependence on others for retention of office with its consequent danger
of political influence, that occasions the greatest criticisms against a public de-
fender systems 1 Voluntary defender units on the other hand are subject to no
public control and are privately administered. The governing body which runs
the organization and which selects the staff is generally a board of directors com-
prised of the leading members of the legal community.
The last of the types of systems for providing legal assistance to the in-
digent is a rather unique combination of the public and voluntary defender sys-
tems. These are, in effect, voluntary defender units entirely financed by public
funds which retain their traditional private administration and control. This
system of providing counsel is quite rare, being found at present only in the
cities of Buffalo and Rochester in the State of New York.
62
58. N.Y.C. Special Committee 48, see also Kadish and Kimball, Legal Representation
of the Indigent in Criminal Cases in Utah, 4 Utah L. Rev. 198, 217-19 (1954) ; Representation
of Indigent in California-A Field Study of the Public Defender and Assigned Counsel
Systems, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 535 (1961).
59. Smith, Justice and the Poor 116 (1919).
60. Brownell, supra note 54, at 125.
61. N.Y.C. Special Committee 75.
62. Id. at 52-53.
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TrE SuRvg
In 1962 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted
a resolution authorizing the president to appoint a special committee to
"... study present practices and to initiate, coordinate and accelerate efforts
to assure adequacy of defense provided indigent persons accused of crime in
the United States. ..." -63 The study64 involved an audit of state systems con-
ducted by the American Bar Foundation in cooperation with the special com-
mittee and associate committees functioning in all states and the District of
Columbia.
To obtain information concerning the various state systems for providing
counsel to the indigent accused, three basic methods were engaged: (1) personal
interviews with judges, prosecutors and defenders in sample counties, 5 (2) mail
questionnaires to judges and prosecutors in all nonsample counties, and (3) a
study of court dockets in sample cases for the year 1962.0
In New York State, ten sample counties0 7 were selected for personal sur-
vey by two reporters appointed by the American Bar Foundation for that pur-
pose.6 8 In six of the sample counties,69 615 sample cases were examined. Mail
questionnaires were forwarded to District Attorneys 0 and judges 7' in the re-
maining 52 counties. Returns from mail questionnaires to defense attorneys
throughout the state were too sparse to form the basis of an accurate analysis
and thus are not expressed in this report. However, the views of personally in-
terviewed defense attorneys have been incorporated. The survey was conducted
in 1963 and related to existing systems and data as of the year 1962. Although
information about misdemeanors and offenses was peripherally gathered, the sur-
vey concerned itself principally with the plight of the indigent felony defendant.
The Indigency Rate and its Relationship to Systems Under
Which Eligibility for Court -Appointed Counsel is Established
Central to a determination of the efficacy of any given system designed to
provide adequate representation to the indigent accused is a finding as to the
probable number of persons required to be serviced. Findings in this area were
63. 87 A.B.A. Rep. 468 (1962).
64. The study was financed by a Ford Foundation Grant and contributions from the
American Bar Foundation and American Bar Association.
65. 300 counties were selected from the 3100 counties in the United States. The
method of selection was devised by the National Opinion Research Center, University of
Chicago and is detailed in Appendix B to the National Report tentatively entitled:
Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts-A Field Study and
Report (1964).
66. 11,300 sample cases in 194 of the sample counties were studied.
67. Clinton, Erie, Nassau, New York, Niagara, Onondaga, Otsego, Putnam, Queens
and Wayne counties.
68. Paul Ivan Birzon and Robert Kasanof.
69. Erie, Nassau, New York, Onondaga, Otsego and Queens counties.
70. The total percentage of district attorneys interviewed either personally or via the
mail questionnaires was 89%.
71. The views of a total of 49 judges are represented in the New York Report. 14
judges were personally interviewed while questionnaires were received from 35 other judges.
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produced through the use of individual docket studies and estimates of the per-
centage of indigent accused persons given by judges and district attorneys.
Though estimates taken in the counties of the state are too varied to establish a
clear relationship between the rate of indigency and the density of population in
a given county,72 the indigency rate of 41.8 per cent produced by the docket
studies in six counties 3 closely corresponds to the estimated average of 41 per
cent of indigent felony defendants produced by the personal survey of district
attorneys in lower New York State. This survey corresponds to the estimated
average suggested by the personally interviewed district attorneys in upper New
York, the mail questionnaires for district attorneys and the mail questionnaires
for judges which in each instance was 49 per cent.74 On the strength of these
data, an estimated statewide indigency rate may be established at approximately
45 per cent, which is not distant from the estimated national rate of approxi-
mately 50 per cent. 5
The indigency rate is, at least in part, a product of the systems utilized
to determine eligibility for appointment of counsel.
Section 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes no express reference
to indigency nor does it provide any standard to guide a determination of eligi-
bility for court-appointed counsel. 6 The statute merely requires that if a de-
72. Data compiled from all mail questionnaires received from the district attorneys
reflect that in counties with populations under fifty thousand inhabitants, the estimated
percentage of indigent felony defendants is 70%. At the same time, the district attorneys
from Erie and New York counties estimated the percentage of indigent felony defendants
in their counties to be 75% and 60% respectively. Internal consistency within counties of
the same population range was also lacking. For example, the district attorneys mail
questionnaire showed an indigency rate of 63% in counties with 50,000 to 99,000 inhabitants,
while personally surveyed Otsego county with 51,492 persons produced an estimate rate
of indigency of 33%.
73.
TABLE I
DsTERmeNATIoN oF INDIGENCY Or DEENDANTS
Total Yes No No Data
County sample No. % No. % No.
New York 250 125 50.2 123 49.3 1 4
Queens 80 33 41.2 47 58.7 0 0
Nassau 80 26 33.3 52 66.6 2 2.5
Onondaga 60 34 56.6 26 43.3 0 0
Otsego 20 5 25.0 15 75.0 0 0
Erie 125 s0 40.0 75 60.0 0 0
74. The estimates range from 15% to 95% in given counties.
75. See American Bar Foundation, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American
State Courts-A Field Study and Report, ch. I (July 1964).
76. Compare N.Y. County Law § 717(2) which provides:
An indigent defendant is one who is not himself financially able to retain
counsel or, in the case of a minor without resources of his own, one whose parent
or guardian is not financially able to retain counsel for him. Before arraignment
a determination of indigency shall be made by the public defender. At or after
the arraignment the determination shall be made by the court. In the event that
the court assigns the public defender to represent a defendant believed to be
indigent and it later appears that such defendant or his family is able to afford
counsel, the public defender shall report this fact to the court and shall not be
required thereafter to represent such defendant.
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fendant appears without counsel" ... he must be asked if he desire [s] the aid of
counsel, and if he does the court must assign counsel.17 Though indigency is
not expressly designated as a condition precedent to the assignment of counsel,
some variety of assertion as to the defendant's inability to retain counsel is al-
most universally required. 78
When a defendant appears without counsel at arraignment on the indict-
ment, he will normally be asked by the judge: "Do you have funds with which to
retain an attorney?" or "Can you afford an attorney?" No judicial or probation
investigation into the individual's resources is launched and ordinarily no de-
tailed inquiry as to employment or assets is made from the bench.79 Occasionally,
the defendant will be asked if he is employed or if he owns real property. If the
circumstances, such as cash bail, suggest that the defendant is able to retain his
own counsel, an adjournment will be granted for that purpose.80 Frequently,
however, counsel is assigned with the understanding that he will himself pur-
sue the matter.8 ' If after the investigation the defendant is found by the attorney
to be ineligible for assigned counsel, he may withdraw or make private arrange-
ments with the defendant and report his newly established relationship to the
assigning judge.
82
As a matter of practice, it was found that assignment of counsel is ap-
proached with extreme sensitivity to the needs of the defendant and the slightest
indication by the accused of his inability to retain private counsel will usually
be held to justify an appointment.
8 3
These findings make difficult a definitive summary of the systems for de-
termining eligibility for assignment of counsel as in fact no prescribed "system"
can be said to exist. As the extent and nature of the inquiry reveals variations
77. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308. Compliance with the mandatory provisions of the
statute is a jurisdictional requirement, the absence of which renders subsequent proceedings
void. Matter of Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909 (1949); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938). See however, People v. Fink, 15 N.Y.2d 679, 204 N.E.2d 214, 255
N.Y.S.2d 887 (1965).
78. See People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 412, 187 N.E. 298, 299 (1933). One county
judge who was personally interviewed in the course of the survey considered himself
legally obliged to provide counsel in all cases where request is made regardless of the state
of the defendant's financial affairs.
79. There is no such statutory requirement.
80. The fact that the defendant has been released on bail is sometimes held to dis-
qualify him from securing free legal services. The New York City Legal Aid Society
generally does not represent the defendants who are free on bail of $1,500 or more.
(The premium for a $1,500 bail bond is $70.) The posting of cash bail will often
disqualify a defendant from the use of the services of the Buffalo Legal Aid Society's
Public Defender who functions in the City Court of Buffalo.
81. The newly instituted public defender in Nassau County requires defendants to
execute a detailed financial questionnaire. See N.Y. County Law § 717(2). This practice
is also followed in the United States district court for the western district of New York.
82. This practice lends itself to occasional abuse. During the course of a personal
interview, a probation officer in one of the surveyed counties subscribing to the traditional
assigned counsel system reported a number of complaints by probationers and their families
with respect to the application of pressure by the assigned attorney to elicit a fee.
83. Waiver of counsel at the arraignment stage was found by the survey to occur
in less then 1% of all cases. In the rare instance in which the defendant insists upon pro-
ceeding without counsel, the arraigning county judge will often assign counsel, on a consulta-
tive basis, to be available when and if needed by the defendant.
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not only from county to county but also among different judges within the same
county, it may not be an exaggeration to state that there exist as many systems
as there are judges.
This diversity in judicial approach to the question of determining indigency
is reflected by the mixed responses to the survey's inquiry calling for an evalua-
tion of the "present system for determining eligibility for assignment of coun-
sel." To illustrate, the mail questionnaires from the district attorneys show that
50 per cent of the interviewees believed the system used in the interviewee's
county to be "about right" while 42 per cent felt it to be "too lenient" and only
3 per cent viewed it as "too strict." These results did not correspond with the
results of the personal interviews. In the latter, seven of the ten district attorneys
believed their systems too lenient while three believed it to be about right. No
one thought it too strict. Personal interviews with defense attorneys in the sur-
veyed counties produced almost universal concurrence that prevailing systems
were too lenient and required re-examination. However, the general feeling of
personally interviewed judges, prosecutors and lawyers was that the determina-
tion of indigency was correct in the great majority of cases. The lack of sharp
definition was generally accepted on the ground that indigency is a relative con-
cept and that an accused who is financially capable of retaining an attorney to
represent him in connection with a petty charge may very well be indigent in
terms of financial ability to secure the services of an attorney in connection with
a charge of felony.
4
An Evaluation of Representation Furnished Under Existing Systems
An aspect of the survey deemed critical to an intelligent assessment of pre-
vailing appointed-counsel systems involved a qualitative comparison of services
furnished by court-appointed counsel with services furnished by attorneys pri-
vately retained by persons accused of crimes.
Tmi DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
When asked to evaluate the services provided by assigned and retained
counsel, eight out of ten of the district attorneys personally interviewed re-
sponded that services provided by assigned counsel compared "favorably" to
those of retained counsel. These responses generally paralleled those received
through the mail questionnaires. District attorneys in smaller counties point
out, however, that the basic reason for the favorable comparison is to be found
in the fact that the individuals to whom assignments are given are, by and large,
the same attorneys who appear in criminal cases as retained counsel. Most of
the interviewees suggested, however, that the prominent failing of the traditional
assigned counsel system lies in the indiscriminate method of selection which
necessarily results in representation by attorneys to whom litigation generally
84. See Attorney General's Report on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal
Justice (1963).
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and criminal litigation particularly in a strange and foreboding experience. Ob-
servations that services provided by court-appointed counsel compared unfavor-
ably with those provided by retained counsel emanated principally from coun-
ties which were rural in character, having small criminal calendars and wherein
the traditional assigned counsel system prevails.85
The overwhelming majority of personally interviewed district attorneys
agreed that the trial abilities of assigned counsel generally do not compare
with those of more experienced and specialized district attorneys or their
assistants. The exception to this generalized statement relates to those court
appointed counsel whose practices embrace a measure of specialization in
criminal matters, including members of Legal Aid Societies.
8 6
85. It may not be inappropriate to review here the general expressions offered by
personally interviewed district attorneys relative to the general adequacy of presently
functioning systems.
In New York and Queens counties, where the Legal Aid Society serves to provide paid,
full-time and experienced law practitioners as court-appointed counsel, the adequacy of the
system was not called into question.
In sparsely populated Putnam county and populous Nassau county, the traditional
assigned counsel system was deemed adequate, indeed excellent. It should be noted that a
public defender, functioning as a branch of the Legal Aid Society, has been recently
instituted in Nassau county.
With the exception of Erie county, where the Aid to Indigent Prisoners Society, Inc.
(commonly known as the Erie County Coordinated Assigned Counsel System) functions,
each of the district attorneys of the personally surveyed counties in upper New York State
condemned the assigned counsel system, challenged its claim to adequacy and recommended
the institution of the public defender system. To illustrate the various attitudes, some of the
comments have been abstracted.
In Onondaga county, the assigned counsel system was deemed "wholly inadequate."
The institution of the public defender system was suggested. It should be remarked that
these comments did not relate to the newly organized coordinated assigned counsel system
which began to function at the approximate time that the interview was conducted and
these remarks recorded.
In Niagara county, although the present system was viewed as "adequate in many
respects," it was deemed unfair and unworkable to "rely upon the few to discharge the
theoretical responsibility of the many." Here too, a public defender system is recommended.
In Clinton county, the system could lay claim 'to adequacy only because the relatively
few attorneys to whom assignments are given are those who regularly act as retained
counsel in criminal matters. It was stated that "the county is in need of a public defender
system which would extend to courts of inferior jurisdiction . . . ; a part-time public
defender would suffice."
In Wayne county, the present system is characterized as "haphazard in operation, and
inadequate in point of quality of representation." Assigned attorneys were deemed to be
"generally inclined toward a hasty disposition of the case with insufficient attention toward
operation." The establishment of a public defender system was preferred to the prevailing
assigned counsel system.
In Ostego county, a public defender system was recommended. The district attorney
remarked that the present system was inclined to "stifle incentive on the part of the
assigned attorney because of the gratuitous nature of the services to be rendered." Instances
were cited wherein the assigned attorney consulted with his client for but a few minutes
in the courtroom.
It should be further noted that in each instance that a public defender system was
suggested to supersede the prevailing assigned counsel system, it was additionally recom-
mended that the defender be appointed by the justices of the appellate division of the
judicial department within which the county was contained.
86. All of the judges and district attorneys interviewed in New York and Queens
counties were of the opinion -that the professional performance of the staff of the New York
Legal Aid Society was on a par with that of the members of the staff of the respective
district attorneys' offices. In several instances the work of the Society's lawyers was rated
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The Judges
Responses to this line of inquiry by judges functioning in the more popu-
lous counties and those presiding in courts within less populous communities
presented a sharp contrast. In the densely populated counties of New York
City where the volume of criminal business is large, the Legal Aid Society has
won acceptance as the principal source of qualified representation for indigent
defendants. Without exception, judges interviewed in New York City expressed
exceedingly high regard for the quality of work of the Legal Aid Society, in
some instances expressing the view that the Society provides better representa-
tion for the indigent accused than retained counsel. Although most of the judges
functioning in courts of general criminal jurisdiction outside the City of New
York expressed general satisfaction with the services of assigned counsel, three
judges stated that assigned counsel are in some degree less qualified than re-
tained counsel and likewise less competent than their prosecuting adversaries.
In at least half of the responses recorded by the mail questionnaire, there are
suggestions of some degree of dissatisfaction with the quality of services pro-
vided indigent defendants by assigned counsel.
Viewed from the surface, these returns would appear to establish a rela-
tionship between the quality of services furnished by court appointed counsel
and the density of the population of the community in which they are per-
formed. The appearance is not the fact. Closer analysis discloses that the only
meaningful factor which bears logical relevancy to the quality of services per-
formed by court appointed counsel is the particular system under which such
counsel acts, and not the number of inhabitants of the community in which
the system is operative. It has been mentioned that in both instances in which
personally interviewed district attorneys made an unfavorable comparison be-
tween court-appointed and retained counsel, the traditional assigned counsel
system prevailed. Characteristic of such a system is the random method of
selection by which attorneys are appointed; introduction of counsel into the
case at a point no earlier than arraignment on the indictment; total lack of
funds with which to conduct an adequate investigation to retain he services
of expert witnesses or to compensate counsel for services.
It is significant that communities with a more advanced species of court-
appointed system produced a consistently favorable comparison between ap-
pointed and retained counsel. It merely happens to be the fact that the latter
type of system is to be found only in the more densely populated communities.
higher than that of the assistants in the district attorneys' offices, and in no instance did
any of the interviewees find the quality of work of the Society's lawyers to be below the
level of the staff of district atorneys' offices. All to whom the question was propounded
agreed that if the principles announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
were extended to include misdemeanors, the present assigned counsel system would become
totally inadequate to function in courts of inferior jurisdiction. Three prosecutors indicated
the present need for a system which would assure the indigent defendant of representation
in the justice of the peace courts and police justice courts.
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Area of Concern Under Existing Systems
Reimbursement and Compensation. With the exception of the capital
case,87 there is no statutory authority by virtue of which counsel may be com-
pensated for services rendered in behalf of his indigent client or by which coun-
sel may be reimbursed for moneys actually expended in connection with the
preparation of a defensive posture. The lack of funds for these purposes is
indigenous to the traditional assigned counsel system.88 By comparison, the
New York City Legal Aid Society maintains a full-time staff of forty-seven
salaried trial and appellate attorneys as well as a staff of six full-time investi-
gators.8 In Erie, Monroe and Onondaga counties, recently imposed modifications
upon the traditional assigned counsel system provide for reimbursement to
counsel for actual out-of-pocket expenditures in connection with the investiga-
tion, preparation and trial of the assigned caseY A recent innovation in Erie
County's coordinated assigned counsel system has served to carve the single
exception to the statewide practice against compensating assigned counsel. The
newly formulated plan contemplates a compensatory allowance of seventy-five
dollars for each trial day following the third day of trial of an assigned case.9
Attitudes of the judges and District Attorneys were elicited with respect
to questions of reimbursement of expenses and compensation for services. Of
the ten district attorneys personally interviewed, but one responded negatively
to the question whether assigned counsel should be reimbursed for their ex-
penses. The response to this issue from the mail questionnaires was unanimously
affirmative. Virtually all of the judges to whom the question was applicable
2
likewise favored reimbursement for actual expenses.
On the other hand, the question whether assigned counsel should be com-
pensated for their services generated substantial disagreement. A clear majority
of all responses from both judges and district attorneys agreed that compensa-
tion should be provided to assigned counsel for services performed for the
indigent defendant. 3 Lack of compensation was cited as a conspicuous inhibitor
to enthusiastic and carefully prepared representation.
87. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308. Prior to the enactment of this section there was
no inherent judicial power to allow compensation to counsel in any case. People v.
DiMedicis, 39 Misc. 438, 80 N.Y. Supp. 212 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1902). As the
statute is the exclusive source of the court's power, it has been strictly construed. People
v. Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 173, 173 N.E.2d 227, 212 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1961); Matter of Grossman,
261 App. Div. 1112, 27 N.Y.S.2d 70 (3d Dep't 1941); People ex rel. Van Zandt v.
Prendergast, 157 App. Div. 486, 142 N.Y. Supp. 611 (2d Dep't 1913); People v. Konono,
41 Misc. 2d 63, 245 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Oneida County Ct. 1963).
88. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308 is limited in its application to capital cases only.
Marcus v. Joseph, 281 App. Div. 336, 119 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1st Dep't 1953); People ex rel.
Whedon v. Board of Supervisors, 192 App. Div. 705, 183 N.Y. Supp. 438 (3d Dep't 1920).
89. Most of the investigators are retired police detectives.
90. A maximum amount for these purposes is usually contemplated. The Erie county
plan commenced its operation with a ceiling amount of $50 for expenses. When it was soon
discovered that flexibility in this area was vital the ceiling was lifted. Under the present
plan, all reasonable expenses will be paid.
91. No compensation is provided for preparatory functions including pre-trial hearings.
92. Forty-six of the total number of forty-seven judges interviewed.
93. A review of the responses contained within the mail questionnaires to judges and
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The individuals positioning themselves in the negative of this question
generally contended that the tradition and sense of duty which compels the
performance of this function should render the question of compensation irrele-
vant. There were also isolated suggestions among those who subscribed to the
minority view that the element of compensation would tend to produce delay
and calendar congestion, encouraging the trial of cases which would otherwise
have been disposed of by pleas of guilty.
Introduction of Court-Appointed Counsel: At What Stage of the Proceeding?
In the State of New York, there exists no statutory mandate that counsel
be appointed at any stage of the criminal proceeding earlier than at arraign-
ment upon the indictment 4 and under the traditional assigned counsel system
this is indeed commonly the first point at which a defendant receives the initial
assistance of counsel. A conclusion as to whether the introduction of counsel
at this point permits adequate legal protection of the accused requires a brief
examination of criminal procedure in the State of New York from the point
of arrest to the arraignment upon indictment.
An action against a criminal suspect begins with his arrest. 8 The right
to counsel is not formally brought to his attention until the occasion of his
first arraignment before a magistrate." In the City of New York, the ar-
raigning magistrate will be a judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New
York.9 7 Outside the City of New York, the magistrate is almost invariably
a city court judge, required by law to be an attorney, 8 or a justice of the
peace of a town or a police justice of a village, who need not be attorneys."
The arraignment consists of informing the defendant of the charge, gen-
erally by a recitation of the Information, advising him of his right to counsel
and of his right to a preliminary hearing.100 The governing procedural stat-
ute'0 ' does not compel the magistrate to inquire whether the defendant has the
means to retain private counsel or whether the assistance of gratuitous legal
district attorneys reflects that 76% of the judges and 61% of the district attorneys who
chose to respond to the question whether assigned counsel be compensated for services
answered in the affirmative.
94. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
95. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 300.
96. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 188, 699.
97. N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 30.
98. "No person, other than one who holds such office at the effective date of this
article, may assume the office of judge of . . . [a] city court outside the city of New York
unless he has been admitted to practice law in this state at least five years or such greater
number of years as the legislature may determine." N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 20(a) (1961).
99. N.Y. Const. art VI, § 20(c). Qualification for town and village justices for office
after September 1, 1962 is conditioned upon the satisfactory completion of a mandatory
course of training and education. L. 1962, ch. 705. A course of training and education has
been approved by the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference. See Judicial
Conference, Eighth Annual Report 103-28 (1963). At the time of the survey, approximately
80% of the state's more than 2,500 town and village justices were non-lawyers.
100. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 188-90.
101. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 188. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 44 and proposed Rules
5(b) and 44(a) discussed in 51 A.B.A.J. 64 (Jan. 1965).
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services is desired, and no express authority for the assignment of counsel by
the magistrate is found in the state's Code of Criminal Procedure. 0 2 In prac-
tice, appointment of counsel at the initial arraignment is seen to be closely
related to the existence of an organized system for furnishing counsel. Among
the courts located in communities subject to personal survey, only in those in
which the Legal Aid Society functioned did the arraignment proceedings include
advising each defendant who appeared without counsel that the services of a
court-appointed attorney would be made available without charge. In the city
courts of other communities subject to the personal survey, appointment of
counsel was not conducted with predictable regularity and assignments were
made either upon request of the defendant or when the exigencies of a particular
case impressed a need therefor upon the presiding magistrate. Assignment of
counsel by lay justices of the peace and police justices was found everywhere
to be rare.
Except in cases where the crime or the defendant is deemed by statute
not to be bailable, 0 3 the magistrate is empowered to set bail. In the upstate
counties subject to personal survey, bail is generally fixed in accordance with
schedules recommended by the District Attorney. When the arraignment is
conducted by the magistrate (who is either a Justice of the Peace or a Police
Justice), the District Attorney is commonly not present and the magistrate
will sometimes fix bail in accordance with the recommendations of the arresting
officer or other members of the constabulary. Absence of counsel at this stage
of the proceeding often precludes application for release of the defendant upon
his own recognizance or in the custody of another, although such disposition
could properly follow were the pertinent facts and circumstances brought to
the attention of the magistrate. 0 4 In the metropolitan New York City area,
the recommendation of the District Attorney is generally followed but the magis-
trates will hear arguments of the attorney who has been appointed to represent
the defendant. 0 5
102. Although the prevailing view finds inherent power in all criminal courts of record
to assign counsel, see People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 187 N.E. 298 (1933). People ex rel.
Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 4 N.Y. Cr. R. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1886), aff'd mer., 102 N.Y.
691 (1886), expressions to the contrary may be found. See People v. Borgstrom, 178 N.Y.
254, 258, 70 N.E. 780, 781 (1904.). In People v. Carney, 36 Misc. 2d 54, 231 N.Y.S.2d 185
(Oneida County Ct. 1962) the refusal of a committing magistrate to assign counsel for a
preliminary felony hearing was held to be insufficient ground for vacatur of a judgment
of conviction. See also People v. Battle, 15 N.Y.2d 669, 204 N.E.2d 208, 255 N.Y.S.2d 880
(1964).
103. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 552.
104. The situation becomes aggravated in counties with a low volume of criminal
business since bail bondsmen are not immediately available. Special arrangements often must
be made to secure the services of a bondsman serving in a distant city. See Bail or Jail,
19 The Record of the Bar Association of the City of New York 11, 28 (1964).
105. While bail has been the subject of intensive study outside the direct scope of
this report, the opportunity to be heard through articulate counsel with respect to the
amount of bail to be fixed is at least arguably an important aspect of the right of counsel.
There was wide spread feeling to be found among the interviewees that at least some
defendants, by losing their regular employment as a result of being confined in default of
bail, are rendered indigent when otherwise they might not be.
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A defendant who has been accused of committing a felony is entitled as
of right to a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to hold him for a grand jury action. 1 6 This right is waivable.107 In
practice, the preliminary hearing serves two other vital functions. The facts
developed at the hearing may persuade the prosecutor to proceed instead with
a misdemeanor prosecution because of the intrinsic weakness of his case or
the character of his complaining witness, despite the fact that a felony may be
technically made out. Moreover, the preliminary hearing affords the defendant
one of his few opportunities for informal pretrial discovery. The hearing affords
defense counsel the opportunity to commit sworn testimony of the People's
witnesses to a written record at a time shortly after the event when recollections
are presumably fresh, in order that such statements may be used on the trial
as a test of the same witness' memory and credibility. Furthermore, evidence
adduced at the preliminary hearing may form the basis of defense counsel's
judgment that the best interests of his client may be served by advising him
to enter a plea of guilty to a reduced charge.
From a tactical point of view it is not always wise to request that a hearing
be conducted. Where witnesses testify at a preliminary hearing in the presence
of the defendant who has had an opportunity to cross-examine, the deposition
of the witness may be read in evidence on the trial upon the showing of the
witness' unavailability as defined by statute.108 Consequently, the transitory
character of the complaining witness becomes material. It is thus manifest that
the decision to exercise one's right to a preliminary hearing cannot be intelli-
gently made without knowledge of important ramifications on the trial, since
under the circumstances defined above, an unwise and untutored decision by
the indigent defendant to conduct the preliminary hearing pro se may result in
the perpetuation of the testimony of witnesses which may well work to his
detriment upon the trial.
Under the traditional assigned counsel system, if the indigent defendant
is held for grand jury action by the magistrate, the earliest point at which he is
legally entitled to the right of the services of appointed counsel is at the arraign-
ment upon the indictment. 0 9 In the more populous counties where grand juries
are convened regularly, the indictment may be returned within a period of two
to four weeks. In the more rural counties, however, grand juries are infrequently
convened and it is entirely likely that a long interim period between commit-
ment for grand jury action and the return of an indictment may follow. 110
This lengthy period, during which the indigent defendant presumably re-
mains confined to the county jail, may result in prejudice to the defendant's
106. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 190.
107. Ibid.
108. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 8(3).
109. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 308.
110. In Otsego and Clinton counties, for example, there are but three terms of court
for which the grand jury was drawn in 1962. In the latter county, there is an interim
of five months between terms during which the grand jury sits.
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rights in many respects. First, and most obviously, if the case is one where the
People's proof will not justify the return of a true bill, the time spent by the
defendant in jail awaiting presentment to the grand jury will have been need-
lessly wasted. A failure of proof at the earlier point of a preliminary examination
would have prevented the necessity of committing an indigent defendant to
await exoneration by the grand jury."' The second point lies in the realm of
the practical: the best available statistical data indicate that throughout the
state but one of ten felony cases results in a verdict after trial.112 The remain-
ing nine represent pleas of guilty to something less than all of the charges for
which the defendant has been indicted and commonly to a misdemeanor count
or a lesser crime included in one of the felony counts in the indictment." 3
Consequently the likelihood is strong that many defendants who have
been held for grand jury action will ultimately be permitted to plead to a crime
over which the committing magistrate would have complete dispositive juris-
diction as a court of special sessions. However, neither the prosecutor nor the
defense is in a position to intelligently evaluate the possible plea until such
time as each learns something of the quality and quantity of proof involved
in the case. The prosecutor's decision to allow a defendant to plead guilty
to a misdemeanor and dismiss the pending felony charge is motivated by many
factors not the least of which is his analysis of the proof-tested for the first
time under cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. It follows that if
the defendant is permitted to enter a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor before a
court of special sessions through the medium of a new Information, his oppor-
tunity for rehabilitation by confinement or otherwise is accelerated and his time,
otherwise well spent, is not needlessly wasted in the county jail awaiting grand
jury action and trial.
Thirdly, if the unrepresented indigent defendant is committed to jail to
await grand jury action, investigation must necessarily be deferred until such
time as counsel is introduced into the case. In the meanwhile evidence becomes
stale and sometimes unavailable. Lastly, the unrepresented defendant who
awaits grand jury action in his county jail cell is more often than not unaware
of his right to waive immunity and appear before the grand jury." 4 The right
to testify before the grand jury is sparingly exercised even by represented
defendants because of the obvious danger to a defendant that testimony given
under examination by the District Attorney may later be introduced against
111. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 207.
112. See Judicial Conference, Eighth Annual Report 224 (1963). In 1962, of the total
number of 93 assigned cases in Niagara, Clinton, Wayne and Oswego counties, all were
disposed of by pleas of guilty or dismissal on pre-trial motion. In the same year only 21 of
148 assigned cases in Onondaga county were disposed of by trial.
113. See Table II on page 446.
114. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 250(2); see People v. Battle, 15 N.Y.2d 669, 204
N.E.2d 208, 255 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1964); People v. Blair, 33 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
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him." 5 However, in a case where the defendant is able to show some striking,
mitigating circumstance, grand juries are known to dismiss technically sufficient
cases in the exercise of practical wisdom and clemency. Often this is done with
the encouragement of the District Attorney.
Against this procedural and functional backdrop, we may proceed to ex-
amine the responses to the question, "Under an ideal system, at what stage in
a criminal case do you think the indigent person should first be provided with
a lawyer if he wants one?"
Of the ten District Attorneys personally interviewed, five considered the
first stage to be between arrest and the first appearance before a magistrate.
Notably, two of these five interviewees represented counties of dense population.
Of the remaining five, only one interviewee thought that the first stage should
be at the arraignment on indictment. Two selected the first appearance before
a magistrate, and two the time between the first appearance and the preliminary
hearing. Of the responses from the District Attorneys interviewed by mail ques-
tionnaires, 81 per cent considered that the first stage should be at some point
before the filing of indictment. Taken as a whole, the majority of the District
Attorneys interviewed indicated that the first stage at which legal services should
be made available to an indigent accused should be no later than the period
between his first appearance before a magistrate and the preliminary hearing
and preferably at his first appearance before a magistrate.
Among the fourteen judges personally interviewed, six believed that under
an ideal system counsel should be made available to indigent persons accused
of crime prior to their first appearance in court. Of the six, three judges were
from counties outside the City of New York. With only two exceptions repre-
senting upstate counties, the remaining judges felt that counsel should be ap-
pointed for indigent defendants no later than the time of arraignment. Responses
from the mail questionnaires were comparable. Eight of the thirty-tWo judges
responding also favored making counsel available to persons accused of
crime prior to .their first appearance in court; some sixteen judges favored
such assignment at the first appearance before the magistrate and three favored
assignment prior to the preliminary hearing. The remaining eight judges
favored assignment no later than at the arraignment on the indictment.
The Kind of Proceeding in Which Appointed Counsel Should Be Furnished
The interviewees were requested to state whether they believed, under an
ideal system, that an attorney should be provided for the indigent person in five
classes of cases: sentencing following a plea of guilty or conviction after trial;
post-conviction remedy proceedings including habeas corpus and coram nobis;
probation revocation hearings; misdemeanors; civil proceedings to commit the
mentally ill, including alcoholics and narcotic addicts.
115. See People v. Guidareli, 22 A.D.2d 336, 255 N.Y.S.2d 975 (3d Dep't 1965);
Matter of Morse, 42 Misc. 664, 87 N.Y. Supp. 721 (Ct. Gen. Sess. New York County 1901).
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Sentencing. A criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel
at every stage of the proceeding.116 Although the absence of counsel at the
sentencing stage of the proceeding will not always require resentencing,
117
it is found to be almost the universal practice throughout the state to assign
counsel at this point of the case if the defendant so requests. Practice varies
however when an indigent defendant who has expressly waived appointment of
counsel at some earlier stage of the proceeding appears for judgment without
counsel. In many instances, the sentencing judge will again remind the de-
fendant of his right to be represented by counsel. As often as not, judgment will
be imposed without this reminder. While all of the district attorneys personally
interviewed were unanimous in the view that counsel should be provided at
the sentencing stage, 11 per cent of the district attorneys responding to the
mail questionnaires felt otherwise. The collective viewpoints of the judges were
comparable to those produced by the District Attorneys survey.
Post Conviction Remedies. An evidentiary hearing granted pursuant to a
writ of error coram nobis to resolve issues of facts is considered part of the
original criminal action. Consequently, counsel will be appointed upon the
petitioner's request. 118 Although a habeas corpus hearing is civil in nature,11
a like rule applies. 120 In neither of these proceedings however is counsel re-
quired to be assigned prior to a judicial determination that a triable issue of
fact exists. 12 Thus, petitions for a writ of error coram nobis or habeas corpus
are commonly prepared by the prisoner without the assistance of counsel.
Likewise, the duty of the court to provide the petitioner with an awareness,
through specific advices, of his right to appointment of counsel is not at all
certain. Again, practice in this respect varies considerably.
There was little dispute among the judges and district attorneys inter-
viewed concerning the question of availability of counsel in both kinds of pro-
ceedings. Indeed, these personally interviewed were unanimous in the view
that counsel should be made available; only 19 per cent of district attorneys
interviewed by mail questionnaires dissented from this position. The most
notable qualification offered by those expressing the majority view related to the
feeling that in all post-conviction remedy proceedings there should be some
showing of merit before counsel is assigned. While most of the interviewees were
silent as to this aspect of the question, there were no responses which would
support the position that counsel be made available prior to the granting of an
evidentiary hearing.
116. People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 187 N.E. 298 (1933).
117. People v. Hasenstab, 283 App. Div. 433, 128 N.Y.S.2d 388 (4th Dep't 1954). See
People v. Williams, 3 Misc. 2d 797, 159 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Ct. Gen. Sess. New York County
1956).
118. People v. St. John, 281 App. Div. 1061, 121 N.Y.S.2d 441 (3d Dep't 1953).
119. N.Y. CPLR § 7001.
120. N.Y. CPLR § 1102 (a). This provides that "the Court in its order permitting a
person to proceed as a poor person may assign an attorney." See People ex rel. Allen v.
Murphy, 19 A.D.2d 774, 245 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (4th Dep't 1963).
121. See People v. St. John, 281 App. Div. 1061, 121 N.Y.S.2d 441 (3d Dep't 1953).
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As a matter of federal constitutional law, counsel must be appointed to
represent an indigent defendant who desires to appeal his conviction.122 This
principle applies only to appeals taken as of right to the first reviewing court.
In the State of New York, an appeal may be taken by a defendant as a matter
of right from a judgment of conviction or from an order denying a motion to
vacate a judgment of conviction, otherwise known as a motion or application
for a writ of error coram nobis.123 The first appeal as of right may be taken to
the appellate division of the supreme court from a conviction by the supreme
court or county court, or to the county court from a conviction by a court of
special session, police court, police magistrate or a justice of the peace.'24 An
appeal to the Court of Appeals as of right may be taken only in the case where
the judgment carries the death penalty. 25 In the first and second departments
of the appellate division of the supreme court, the full time appeals staff of the
New York Legal Aid Society conducts many of the appeals arising within its
jurisdiction. Additionally, the Society distributes other appeals to attorneys
from a list of reputable law firms who have volunteered the services of their
members. The preparation of these appeals is supervised by the Society. This
approach has met with the approval of both presiding justices of the two
departments.
In the fourth department of the appellate division, selection of assigned
counsel on appeal is normally made from lists of attorneys provided by the
administrators of the organized assigned counsel systems within the depart-
ment or by the presidents of the bar associations in those counties adhering to
the traditional assigned counsel systems.
In the third department of the appellate division the names of assigned
counsel on appeal are usually proposed by members of the court who come
from the judicial district in which the case arises. The trial attorney is often
assigned to continue his representation on appeal. In other cases, names are
proposed on the basis of the judges' familiarity with the quality of the at-
torney's work or from the various lists which designate the names of mem-
bers of the Bar in the various judicial districts.
Probation Revocation Hearings. A probationer who has denied that he has
violated his terms of probation must be provided with notice of the violation
charged, and an opportunity to attack or deny the charge.' 26 There is no
requirement for formal procedures however. 2 7 Although the fair hearing con-
templated by section 935 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may require pro-
122. Douglas v. California, 373 U.S. 353 (1963); People v. Hughes, 15 N.Y.2d 172,
204 N.E.2d 849, 256 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1965).
123. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 517.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 935. People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d
235 (1953).
127. People v. Oskroba, supra note 50, at 117, 111 N.E.2d at 237; People ex rel.
Massengale v. McMann, 8 A.D.2d 645, 184 N.Y.S.2d 922 (3d Dep't 1959).
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viding the probationer with an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel in the
event that a specific request has been made,128 there appears to be no duty to
inform the defendant that he has a right to counsel in connection with revocation
of probation proceedings. 1 29 Serious due process questions may be raised in
the event of the refusal of a request for court-appointed counsel by an alleged
probation violator. It seems clear, however, that the court is not obligated to
inform the probationer of the availability of court-appointed counsel.
Eighty per cent of the district attorneys personally interviewed agreed
that counsel should be appointed in a probation revocation hearing. This closely
parallels the responses of 89 per cent of the district attorneys interviewed
through the mail questionnaires. The majority of the judges were in accord with
this view.
Misdemeanors. Although the court of special sessions is mandated at the
arraignment to inform the defendant that he is entitled to assistance of counsel
at every stage of the proceedings, 130 there is no like requirement that the court
inquire whether the defendant desires the aid of counsel or that counsel must
be appointed in the event of specific request therefor. Although the language
in Gideon v. Wainwright'13 is of sufficient breadth to contemplate appointment
of counsel in misdemeanor cases" 2-and one federal court has so interpreted
the decision' 3 -the question has never been squarely raised in the state of
New York. It has been noted elsewhere in this study'8 4 that appointment of
counsel will be made as a matter of course in those courts in which a legal aid
society regularly functions. And although assignment of counsel is extremely
rare in the justice courts, particularly in those in which a lay justice presides,
appointments will occasionally be made by city court judges where a specific
request for counsel is made or, in the absence of such a request, where the
circumstances reflect an obvious need for representation. 18 5
The percentage of personally interviewed district attorneys who favor
furnishing counsel in misdemeanor cases was 70 per cent. This figure was re-
markably close to the 69 per cent of those district attorneys interviewed through
the medium of the mail questionnaires who likewise favored the appointment
of counsel in this type of case. A majority of the judges were in agreement
with this position.
Civil Commitment Proceedings. Of the eight personally interviewed dis-
trict attorneys who offered an opinion as to whether counsel should be pro-
128. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); People v. Roland, 6 Misc. 2d 986,
164 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Saratoga County Ct. 1957).
129. People v. St. Louis, 3 A.D.2d 883, 161 N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1957); People v.
Roland, supra note 52.
130. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 699.
131. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
132. Id. at 344.
133. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
134. See supra, p. 434.
135. In 1963, before the institution of the Onondaga County Coordinated Assigned
Counsel System, 26 assignments emanated from the Syracuse City Court.
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vided to indigent persons facing civil commitment, including the mentally ill,
alcoholics, and narcotic addicts, five favored appointments while three did not.
The breakdown in responses from those district attorneys interviewed through
the mail questionnaires was not comparable. While 74 per cent of interviewees
favored the appointment of counsel, only 55 per cent in this class felt that the
absence of counsel was unfair to the defendant. Eighteen per cent of the dis-
trict attorneys interviewed through this medium responded negatively to the
appointment of counsel in civil commitment proceedings. Likewise, the major-
ity of judges did not favor representation for indigent persons in this type of
proceeding.
THnE SURVEY IN PERSPECTIVE
The value of the survey in this state does not lie in the novelty of its
discoveries. It has unearthed nothing of a startlingly new nature. Rather
its value is the confirmation of the oft-expressed suspicions that the traditional
assigned counsel system is simply not adequate to meaningfully discharge society's
duty to furnish adequate legal representation to the indigent person accused of
crime. Among other deficiencies, the most conspicuous failing of the assigned
counsel system is its inability to harness, assemble and effectively combine all
the available energies of the legal community and the public at large.
Operating wtihin the framework of our present legislative scheme, the
indigent accused is seen to be seriously disadvantaged by the relatively late
introduction of assigned counsel. Lack of funds with which to enable counsel
to conduct an adequate investigation, to solicit expert advice, to retain the
services of expert witnesses, and generally to prepare an adequate defensive
posture, is critical. Few attorneys, if given the choice, would be prepared to
enter the fray against the state's Goliath with David's slingshot. Nor should
they be compelled to do so. The efforts of private philanthropy to secure the
necessities of life to the poor have long ago been replaced by institutional
reform. By what rationale can the State of New York justify spending in
excess of $660,000,000 anually for the physical wants of its poor and hardly a
pittance to secure their equally precious rights under law? Nor is lack of
compensation for services provided by assigned counsel without its serious
consequences. To say nothing of the unfair economic burden which the un-
compensated assigned case represents to the average practitioner, a realistic ap-
praisal of human nature dictates that absent even minimal reward, devotion
to duty is often drained of some measure of enthusiasm thus necessarily up-
setting the balance in the adversary proceeding.
Called upon as we are to assess the adequacy of the existing traditional
assigned counsel system in terms of whether society has discharged its duty to
provide the indigent accused with the best resources that the community may
be reasonably expected to offer, we must conclude that it simply does not pass
muster. If the state has indeed consigned its resources to dormancy pending a
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clear demonstration of the need for their use, it may consider that the time has
arrived.
The results of the survey clearly establish that the organized, coordinated
defender system, whether within the framework of a formally constituted legal
aid society or as a centrally administered assigned counsel system which locks
together many important community resources, eliminates most of the features
deemed objectionable in the traditional assigned counsel system and provides
early, devoted and skilled representation to the indigent accused in almost
every type of proceeding where confrontation with the state may result in the
imposition of penal consequences.
It is equally apparent that no one defender system is perfectly and in all
respects designed to meet the needs of all communities in the state, varying
as they do in size, bar membership, criminal volume, financial resources and
philosophical approach. But in almost every community the survey compels the
conclusion that the traditional assigned counsel system must be liberated from
its long-standing infirmities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A full-time defender system supported by either private philanthropic or
public funds, or a combination of both, is the most desirable method of hand-
ling the problems of indigent defendants in communities with a significant
volume of criminal business. 136 This system assures professionally specialized
protection of the rights of the indigent accused and makes possible the con-
tinuity of supervision by the bench, the bar and the public. It provides a large
degree of assurance to the defendant that the responsibility for safeguarding
his legal interests has been committed to the hands of a person who is fully
trained and competent to practice in the branch of law dealing with criminal
matters, and further assures that such representation will be implemented by
sufficient funds to allow preparation of an adequate defense posture.
Since a principal objection voiced against the publicly supported defender
system is that its reliance on public funds draws into question the independence
and vigor of the defender, it is believed that this objection is best met by a
mixed public-private defender system, the independence of which is safeguarded
by a private, non-governmental board of directors. Illustrative of such a system
is the New York City Legal Aid Society, the newly instituted defender system
in Nassau County and the Erie County Aid to Indigent Prisoners Society,
Inc.
As many counties commit the prosecution of criminal cases to a District
Attorney who functions on less than a full-time basis,137 it may be equally
appropriate to engage the services of a part-time salaried defender.
136. It should be noted that even in counties where a full-time defender system exists,
some measure of implementation by other assigned counsel must be contemplated where
a conflict of interest in multi-defendant litigation requires. See N.Y. County Law § 718.
137. Of the 38 returns to the mail questionnaires to district attorneys, 13% of the
responses indicated that less than their full time was devoted to official duties. In the
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Where the volume of criminal cases or other relevant factors do not justify
the institution of either a full or part-time defender, the traditional assigned
counsel system should be strengthened by requiring appointment of counsel at
the first appearance of the defendant before the magistrate, by reimbursing
assigned counsel for actual expenditures for preparatory and investigatory
functions, and by providing him with a moderate fee. The fee given -should
function primarily to relieve the assigned attorney of hardship and to restore
an otherwise lost measure of enthusiasm to the adversary proceeding, but it
should not be so large as to make assignments to private practitioners a source
of political patronage. Continuing legal educational programs should emphasize
recent developments in substantive and procedural criminal law in order to
allay the fears of unfamiliarity commonly experienced by the general prac-
titioner and the neophyte.
A legislative scheme which would permit each county to determine whether
its system requires improvement is seen not to be workable.138 Each county
should be compelled to formulate and submit to an appropriate department
of the appellate division a plan for furnishing adequate representation to the
indigent accused. It should be required that the plan comply with minimal
standards, established by rules of the respective departments, generally com-
porting with those guidelines suggested here.'3
Every defender system of whatever variety should be designed to be co-
extensive with its needs. The protections proposed for felony defendants should
be extended to misdemeanor defendants and defendants involved in the more
serious petty offense cases. In many misdemeanor and petty offense cases the
consequences of conviction, particularly to a person without a prior criminal
record, may be just as onerous as those following a felony conviction. Not only
do misdemeanants face possible jail sentences and fines, but in addition they
may be permanently stigmatized and limited in their pursuit of future em-
ployment. This is clearly true in cases involving sexual and assaultive of-
fenses.140 In view of the increasing number of public employees in the large
number of employment situations requiring fidelity bonds and other intensive
scrutiny of personal background, the decision as to whether the community
will provide legal services to the indigent should be based on the nature of the
consequences of conviction rather than on the abstract legal classification
within which the transgressive act happens to fit itself.
personal interview however, 70% of the district attorneys indicated the expenditure of
more than 30 hours a week.
138. With respect to the question of the willingness of local government to finance
and improve their system for providing representation to indigent defendants, the general
consensus was that this would be an exceedingly difficult task. Many of the interviewees
held that a movement to finance a public defender system or to provide funds with which
to pay assigned counsel would meet with unequivocal rejection as a politically unattractive
money measure. Most interviewees agreed that action by the local boards of supervisors-
would require a legislative mandate.
139. See Criminal Justice Act, 88 Stat. 45S (1964), 18 U.S.C. 3006 A.
140. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 887(4); N.Y. Pen. Law § 772(8).
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A systematic method of handling appeals of indigent defendants should
be developed by each of the appellate divisions and should include at least one
full-time salaried attorney experienced in criminal appellate practice who,
in addition to preparing and conducting appeals himself, would supervise other
attorneys to whom appellate cases are assigned. The nature of appellate review
is such that the burden of handling appeals can be more safely distributed
throughout the legal community as a whole than may the conduct of criminal
trials. This is particularly true where there is an opportunity for assigned coun-
sel to discuss the special problems of criminal appeals with experienced and
expert appellate defenders. An appellate brief can undergo several revisions
with relative leisure. An objection to a question or a motion for a mistrial can-
not. Assigned counsel on appeal should be reimbursed for expenses and pro-
vided with a reasonable fee.
141
The problem posed by collateral attacks upon convictions such as in
motions for writs of error coram nobis, presents a more complex situation be-
cause of the great volume of such applications which emanate from our prisons.
Many of these applications obviously have no merit and tend to be repetitious
of previous applications with respect to which a disposition has been made.
Providing counsel in every such instance would impose an enormous burden on
the Bar. Again in this situation, the full-time appellate defender, assisted by in-
dividually assigned counsel, would appear to be an acceptable solution.
The statistical record keeping of the courts which administer criminal
justice has been found lacking. The present record keeping is pointed only
toward controlling the work of the courts and indicating such factors as the
size of backlog and the length of time taken to process cases. More adequate
records are required in all the major offense categories, in regard to the number
of indigent defendants, the number of indictments, the number of defendants in-
dicted, the age of defendants, the number of counsel assigned, tie results of
trials, and the nature of sentences. Such record keeping is vital in order to as-
sure the improved administration of justice in general and more particularly
to furnish much needed objective information on the basis of which an evalua-
tion of the prevailing court-appointed counsel system may be made.
The question of providing counsel for indigents between the time of
arrest and their first appearance before a magistrate is a problem that de-
serves further careful study. It has been shown that a substantial number
of judges and district attorneys indicate that under the ideal system counsel
should be made available to defendants as soon as they are taken into police
custody. A decision as to whether or not it is appropriate for the defendant
to make a statement to the police is clearly one which should not be made
without the assistance of counsel. Such a decision often effectively determines
141. The Court of Appeals maintains a fund from which the travelling expenses
of assigned counsel are paid. The third and fourth departments of the appellate division
maintain funds for similar purposes.
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the course of the judicial proceedings which follow. 142 As a practical matter,
persons who are charged with so-called "financial" crimes, such as violations
of the security laws, income tax evasion and the like, as well as members of
the organized underworld, do have the effective assistance of counsel at the
investigatory stage. Deprivation of counsel at this stage extends primarily to
the poor, ignorant, and to persons comparatively inexperienced in their rela-
tions with police and with investigative officials.
There are enormous practical obstacles to the eradication of this inequity.
The dispatch of lawyers to indigent defendants at every police station in
the state at all hours of the day and night poses staggering problems. This
question presents one of the major unresolved issues in the equal administration
of justice for the rich and poor and an energetic study in this area should be
undertaken.
143
Legislation should be enacted to resolve any question of the power of a
court of special sessions to appoint counsel to an indigent accused. The problem
of the indigent defendant in misdemeanor cases is seen to be directly related
to the lay character of many of the justices presiding at these courts. This
problem will be undertaken as a subject of special study in a future article.
CONCLUSION
Whatever be the nature of its origin, the right to life and all that it implies
is governed by the laws and actions of men. The poor man's yearning for food
is not less because he is poor. Nor is his desire to be free. When that freedom
is threatened by the institution of a criminal action by the state, society's sensi-
tivity to his needs must be no less than to the hungry and lame. It should
scarcely require extended discussion to conclude that the right of the indigent
accused to the same values which all men hold dear imposes some kind of duty
upon the state to secure that right against relinquishment because of the
fortuity of his poverty. The question which has provoked legitimate contro-
versy is rather the nature and extent of that duty.
It is not enough to provide courts manned by an independent judiciary
sworn to provide equal justice for all. The essence of criminal justice under law
is the establishment of guilt or innocence through the medium of a fair trial.
Under our system, a fair trial contemplates the emergence of truth through the
clash of adversaries who, with a measure of tolerance allowed in all human
affairs, are presumed to be equally possessed of the means and skills to dis-
charge their sworn duties.
The duty to provide counsel to an indigent person accused of felony is
by no means new in New York State. It has existed for at least three-quarters
of a century before the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in
Gideon v. Wainwright. Gideon merely gave the duty a constitutional dimension.
142. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
143. Note, Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 573
(1962).
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Historically, the state has chosen to discharge its duty by heavily depending
upon the private resources and philanthropy of the legal community to solve the
problem of the indigent accused under the heading of professional responsibility.
Nor has the legal profession failed to discharge its burden. It has done so nobly
for more than a century. But a system born in an age of the general prac-
titioner, in communities having a predominantly rural posture with a limited
measure of criminal business, cannot survive unchanged in a world of increased
specialization where the practitioner of criminal law requires a highly developed
skill and where the sheer force of ever increasing cases presents a staggering
burden to the relatively few members of the community who stand prepared
to bear it. The addition of misdemeanors to the class of cases for which the
services of court-appointed counsel is necessary would add a weight which no
assigned counsel system could sustain.
